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CASE COMMENTS
Getting Back In: The Plasencia Decision
and the Permanent Resident Alien's Right
to Procedural Due Process
In Landon v. Plasencia, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and held that a
permanent resident alien returning to the United States from
a brief visit abroad is not necessarily entitled to have the ques-
tion of her admissibility determined at a deportation hearing.
The Court has, however, clarified the standards to be applied
in determining, on a case-by-case basis, what process is due.
After tracing the development of relevant case law as it has
affected the rights of the permanent resident alien, the author
concludes that the practical effect of Plasencia actually may be
to ensure the higher standard of treatment originally ordered
by the Ninth Circuit.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the night of June 29, 1975, Maria Plasencia, a citizen
of El Salvador and United States permanent resident alien, tried
to gain legal entry into the United States at the Mexican border.'
When customs agents found six nonresident aliens2 in Mrs.
Plasencia's car, she was detained' and eventually subjected to a
summary exclusion hearing. When denied admission to the United
States on grounds of attempting to smuggle illegal aliens into the
1. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 324 (1982).
2. "The term 'alien' means any person not a citizen or national of the United States." 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1976).
3. The authority of immigration officers to inspect and detain aliens at the border is
found at 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (1976).
4. For a discussion of exclusion proceedings, see infra text accompanying notes 46-62.
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country,' Mrs. Plasencia was denied access to her home of the
previous five years, the country of her husband's citizenship, and
the birthplace of her children. The challenge raised to that exclu-
sion order was eventually to reach the United States Supreme
Court,' which subsequently held that Mrs. Plasencia, as a United
States permanent resident alien, was vested with due process
rights that may have been violated in the course of the exclusion
hearing.
The two issues dealt with at the exclusion hearing' were: (1)
whether Mrs. Plasencia was making an "entry" into the United
States, in the statutory and judicial sense of the word;9 and (2) if
so, whether she was guilty of smuggling aliens for gain. Answering
each question in the affirmative, the immigration judge ordered
Mrs. Plasencia's exclusion. The Board of Immigration Appeals dis-
missed her administrative appeal and denied her motion to reopen
the proceedings. 10 On a writ of habeas corpus, the United States
District Court for the Central District of California vacated the
Board's decision and ruled that the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS) could proceed against Mrs. Plasencia, if at all,
only in deportation proceedings." The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that INS could not
litigate issues of "entry" and excludability of permanent resident
aliens in exclusion hearings."2 The Supreme Court recognized the
5. "Any alien who at any time shall have, knowingly and for gain, encouraged, induced,
assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or try to enter the United States in
violation of law [shall be excluded from the United States]." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(31) (1976).
6. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321 (1982).
7. "The term 'lawfully admitted for permanent residence' means the status of having
been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an
immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed." 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1976). The word "permanent" does not carry its common connotation
and is instead defined as "a relationship of continuing or lasting nature, as distinguished
from temporary, but a relationship may be permanent even though it is one that may be
dissolved eventually at the instance either of the United States or of the individual, in
accordance with law." Id. § 1101(a)(31) (emphasis added).
S. Plasencia v. Sureck, 637 F.2d 1286, 1287 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Landon v.
Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321 (1982).
9. A border crossing does not necessarily amount to an "entry" for purposes of applying
immigration law. The term was first defined by statute in the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 101(a)(13), 66 Stat. 163, 167 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)
(1976)). The Court later interpreted that definition in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449
(1963). See infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
10. 103 S. Ct. at 325.
11. Id.
12. 637 F.2d at 1289.
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due process rights of permanent resident aliens;"3 rather than en-
dorsing the court of appeals' wholesale prohibition against such
use of exclusion hearings, however, the Court reversed and re-
manded for possible findings of specific violations of Mrs.
Plasencia's due process rights by INS.
This Casenote will examine two areas of immigration law that
have both affected, and may be affected by, the Plasencia decision:
(1) the reentry doctrine,1 ' and (2) the differences between deporta-
tion hearings and exclusion proceedings." A summary of the Su-
preme Court's analysis will be followed by the conclusion that the
practical effect of the Court's opinion may, in fact, closely approxi-
mate the status of rights for the permanent resident alien envi-
sioned by the Ninth Circuit.
II. THE REENTRY DOCTRINE
The reentry doctrine in essence provides that an alien who
leaves the United States is subject to the provisions of the immi-
gration laws upon his return." A major reason for the doctrine's
significance is that an alien's entry into the United States initiates
a five-year probationary period after which various offenses no
longer apply as grounds for deportation.1 7 By treating all subse-
quent entries as the first, the doctrine lengthens this probationary
13. See infra text accompanying notes 83-90.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 16-44.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 45-75.
16. See 1A C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 4.6c
(1981); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(17) (1976) ("The term 'immigration laws' includes this
chapter [12, Immigration and Nationality] and all laws, conventions, and treaties of the
United States relating to the immigration, exclusion, deportation, or expulsion of aliens.").
17. For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976) provides in part, regarding deportable
aliens:
Any alien in the United States shall . .. be deported who-
(3) hereafter, within five years after entry, becomes institutionalized at
public expense because of mental disease, defect, or deficiency... ;
(4) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five
years after entry ...
(8) . . . has within five years after entry become a public charge . . .
(13). . . at any time within five years after entry, shall have. . . aided any
other alien to enter or try to enter the United States in violation of law;
(15) at any time within five years after entry, shall have been convicted of
violating the provisions of title I of the Alien Registration Act, 1940.
Id. (emphasis added).
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period. For example, an alien admitted for permanent residence in
1970, who committed a crime involving moral turpitude in 1976, is
not subject to deportation for that crime because the five-year pro-
bationary period had expired before the crime occurred. 18 If, how-
ever, after voluntarily departing the United States in 1971, the
permanent resident alien had returned in 1972, he would remain
deportable because a new probationary period not expiring until
1977 is attached to the subsequent entry. Consequently, the issue
of a resident alien's deportability often focuses on whether read-
mission to the United States constitutes an "entry."
For decades the courts construed the term "entry" literally to
mean any arrival of an alien into the United States, irrespective of
his legal status.1" Therefore, a permanent resident alien who, al-
though never intending to relinquish his American domicile, briefly
visited a foreign country would make an "entry" upon his return to
the United States. The reentry would extend the period of de-
portability for resident aliens.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,20 however, sig-
nificantly changed the doctrine by codifying court decisions that,
in specific instances, ameliorated the harsh effect of the reentry
doctrine on permanent resident aliens.21 The Act provides that
permanent resident aliens "shall not be regarded as making an en-
try into the United States for the purposes of the immigration laws
if the alien proves. . . that his departure to a foreign port or place
. . . was not intended or . . . voluntary."2 For aliens other than
those lawfully admitted for permanent residence, the Act retains a
literal construction and defines "entry" as "any coming of an alien
into the United States, from a foreign port or place . ... "2 Yet
18. See id. § 1251 (a)(4).
19. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422 (1933); Lapina v. Wil-
liams, 232 U.S. 78 (1914).
20. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1253 (1976).
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1976). The Plasencia Court noted Congress's reliance on
two cases in particular in developing its "voluntary" and "intentional" standards for depar-
ture. See 103 S. Ct. at 327 n.6 (quoting S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4; H.R. REP.
No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 32, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 1653,
1683).
In DiPasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947), the Second Circuit held that an
alien who took an overnight sleeper from Buffalo to Detroit on a route passing through
Canada had no intent to leave the United States and thus was not deportable on a ground
dependent upon reentry. In Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947), the United States
Supreme Court held that an alien who had been taken to Cuba to recuperate after his
merchant ship was torpedoed in the Caribbean did not leave the country voluntarily.
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1976).
23. Id.
[Vol. 36:969
PLASENCIA
the circumstances in which a permanent resident alien's return
from a brief foreign sojourn constitutes an entry under the Act's
modified definition remained unclear because Congress failed to
define "intended" or "voluntary" departures.
In the landmark case of Rosenberg v. Fleuti,2 4 the Supreme
Court of the United States attempted to clarify the issue by defin-
ing an intent to depart as one "which can be regarded as meaning-
fully interruptive of the alien's permanent residence. '25 The Court
listed the following factors as relevant to determining such an in-
tent: (1) the duration of the alien's absence from the United
States; (2) the necessity of procuring special travel documents; (3)
and a purpose in leaving that is contrary to some policy reflected
in our immigration laws.2  The Court noted, however, that these
factors are not exhaustive and authorized the lower courts to de-
velop other relevant considerations "by the gradual process of judi-
cial inclusion and exclusion. '27 The Court held that "an innocent,
casual, and brief excursion by a resident alien outside this coun-
try's borders. may not have been 'intended' as a departure disrup-
tive of his resident alien status and therefore may not subject him
to the consequences of an 'entry' into the country on his return."2
The Court's formulation of the "meaningfully interruptive"
test to determine whether a permanent resident alien had intended
to depart did not explicitly describe the test's proper application.
Strict adherence to only the relevant factors articulated by the
Court would create inflexibility and harshness similar to that asso-
ciated with the literal entry definition,29 and would not be consis-
tent with the Court's recognition that other relevant factors must
be developed. 0 Moreover, the Court's plea for a "more civilized
application of our immigration laws" 1 and its perception of a con-
24. 374 U.S. 449 (1963). Fleuti was lawfully admitted to the United States for perma-
nent residence in 1952. He had continuously resided in this country since his admission
except for a brief visit of a few hours to Mexico in 1956. Because Fleuti was a homosexual,
INS attempted to deport him on the ground that at the time of his 1956 return he was an
alien "afflicted with psychopathic personality," as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1976).
374 U.S. at 450-51.
25. 374 U.S. at 462.
26. Id.
27. Id. (quoting Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877)).
-28. Id.
29. See Longoria-Castenada v. INS, 548 F.2d 233, 238 (8th Cir.) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 853 (1977); Vargas-Banuelos v. INS, 466 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1972);
Yanez-Jacquez v. INS, 440 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1971).
30. 374 U.S. at 462.
31. Id.
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gressional intent to mitigate the harsh consequences of strict entry
definitions indicated a primary concern for the humane treatment
of the permanent resident alien.2
Yet most courts have disregarded the liberal tone of Fleuti
and instead have relied on a single "relevant factor" from that case
to find "entry." Probably the most common factor so used has
been whether "the purpose of leaving the country is to accomplish
some object which is itself contrary to some policy reflected in our
immigration laws."33
Aware of the severe consequences flowing from strict adher-
ence to the relevant factors approach, the Fifth Circuit applied the
"meaningfully interruptive" test liberally in two immigration cases.
In Yanez-Jacquez v. INS,3 4 the Fifth Circuit balanced various fac-
tors, including an illicit purpose in departing, to conclude that the
petitioner did not intend to interrupt his status as a resident alien
by visiting Mexico. 5 The Fifth Circuit declared that the peti-
tioner's illicit purpose, though "less than salutory [sic] in nature,"
was not controlling. 6 Rather, the Fifth Circuit stressed the trip's
brevity and singular purpose, the petitioner's outward regard for
this country as his permanent residence despite frequent visits to
Mexico, and his procurement of a Border Crossing Identity Card.
By de-emphasizing the importance of the illicit purpose, the Fifth
Circuit implicitly tipped the balance in favor of Fleuti's more hu-
manitarian approach.
32. See supra note 19.
33. 374 U.S. at 462; see, e.g., Laredo-Miranda v. INS, 555 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1977)
(alien smuggling); Cuevas-Cuevas v. INS, 523 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1975) (same); Lozano-Giron
v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1974) (possession of counterfeit money); Palatian v. INS, 502
F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1974) (drug smuggling); Martin-Mendoza v. INS, 499 F.2d 918 (9th Cir.
1974) (alien smuggling), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113 (1975); Solis-Davilla v. INS, 456 F.2d
424 (5th Cir. 1972) (same).
34. 440 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1971). Yanez-Jacquez was lawfully admitted to the United
States for permanent residence in 1955. In 1963 he briefly visited Mexico, where he was
assaulted and robbed. The following day, armed with an icepick and seeking revenge, he
reentered Mexico. Unable to find his assailants, Yanez-Jacquez returned to the United
States by crossing the Rio Grande. He was apprehended by officers of the U.S. Border Pa-
trol, but was released after his mother brought his Border Crossing Identity Card to the
immigration office.
In 1968 Yanez-Jacquez was convicted of uttering a forged instrument and sentenced to
two years imprisonment. Thereafter, INS sought to deport him pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(4) (1976), which provides for the deportation of an alien who "is convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after entry." INS contended
that § 1251(a)(4) applied because the 1963 return from Mexico constituted an entry. 440
F.2d at 701-02.
35. Id. at 704.
36. Id.
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The Fifth Circuit maintained its liberal view when, in Vargas-
Banuelos v. INS,1 it was in a position to construe the Fleuti
Court's declaration that a meaningful interruption of resident sta-
tus occurs if the alien's purpose in leaving the country contravenes
the immigration laws. The Fifth Circuit interpreted Fleuti as re-
quiring that
a brief departure from this country should not give rise to
grounds for deportation when the alien returns unless some ele-
ment of the alien's state of mind at the time of the departure
subjected him to the charge that he left the country with the
intention to interrupt his residential status."8
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit held that an alien who innocently
departed the United States and, while abroad, formulated a crimi-
nal purpose is not deportable on his return.3 9 Recognizing the diffi-
culty in determining whether a criminal purpose had been formed
prior to or after departure, the court noted that both the spirit and
letter of Fleuti and Yanez-Jacquez demanded a "compassionate
interpretation and concomitant administration" of the immigra-
tion laws.40 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, the added
punishment of deportation was excessive because the petitioner
had already been tried and convicted for his crime.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
37. 466 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1972). Vargas-Banuelos lawfully entered the United States
for permanent residence in 1963. He was forty-one years old and had resided in Colorado
since his admittance with his wife and four children, the youngest of whom was born in the
United States. In 1970 he visited Mexico to pay a condolence call on the family of a cousin
who had recently died. While in Mexico, four Mexicans approached him, seeking his help to
enter the United States illegally. Accepting money from the four men, he arranged for a
third party to meet them in Texas.
Vargas-Banuelos and his confederates were apprehended after crossing the Texas bor-
der. He pleaded guilty in federal district court to four counts of aiding and abetting the four
Mexicans in illegally entering the country. He received suspended sentences on three counts
and was placed on probation for five years. Afterwards, the district court amended its origi-
nal judgment to include a recommendation that INS not deport Vargas-Banuelos. Neverthe-
less, INS sought to deport him pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(13) (1976), which provides for
the deportation of an alien who "at any time within five years after any entry . . . know-
ingly and for gain, encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter
or try to enter the United States in violation of law." 466 F.2d at 1371-72.
38. 466 F.2d at 1374 (emphasis in original).
39. But see Laredo-Miranda v. INS, 555 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1977) (smuggling of aliens
into the United States meaningfully interrupts an alien's permanent residence status even
though his intentions upon leaving were innocent); Cuevas-Cuevas v. INS, 523 F.2d 883 (9th
Cir. 1975) (visit abroad loses innocent purpose at point when alien decides to violate immi-
gration law); Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1974) (innocent intentions on depar-
ture irrelevant where alien attempted to smuggle marijuana upon his return to U.S.).
40. 466 F.2d at 1374.
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also recognized an unnecessary severity in the common approach
to determining whether a permanent resident alien intended to de-
part the United States. In Lozano-Giron v. INS," that court for-
mulated its own set of relevant factors, designed to take into ac-
count the effects expulsion might have on the life of the permanent
resident alien. The factors listed included the number of years the
alien has permanently resided in the United States; whether he
lives with his wife and children; whether he owns a business, home,
or other real estate; whether he is employed; the nature of the en-
vironment to which he would be deported; and his relation to that
environment.4 The court determined that Fleuti mandated con-
sideration of these factors. First, the Seventh Circuit noted that
Fleuti authorized the lower courts' development of these new tests
"by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.""' Sec-
ond, it reasoned that because Fleuti was essentially concerned with
diminishing the harsh effects of low standards for finding "entry,"
the Supreme Court would undoubtedly approve of a group of rele-
vant factors that promoted humane considerations. Although not
referring to it as such, the Seventh Circuit established a balancing
test similar to the one used in Yanez-Jacquez."
Fleuti's "meaningfully interruptive" test has substantially re-
duced the chances that the reentry doctrine will unfairly subject a
permanent resident alien to certain immigration laws every time he
crosses the border. Yet a majority of courts continue to read Fleuti
narrowly, without venturing outside of the confines of those "rele-
vant factors" expressly suggested by the Court. To the permanent
resident alien returning to the United States after a brief visit
41. 506 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1974). Lozano-Giron was admitted to the United States for
permanent residence in late 1963. In 1972 he traveled to Colombia to marry his girlfriend.
Although she declined to marry him, he remained in Colombia for 27 days.
A customs officer stopped and examined Lozano-Giron upon his return to the U.S. and
discovered $2,400 in counterfeit money in his possession. Lozano-Giron pleaded guilty in
federal district court and was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment. The INS tried to
deport him pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1976), which provides for the deportation of
an alien who is convicted and sentenced for a crime involving moral turpitude committed
within five years after entry. INS contended that the 1972 return from Colombia constituted
an entry. 506 F.2d at 1075.
42. 506 F.2d at 1077-78. After considering these factors, the court found that Lozano-
Giron was deportable. The Seventh Circuit noted that "[h]e had neither wife nor children
living in the United States" and had "introduced no evidence as to any property or employ-
ment ties with the United States nor as to any dangers awaiting him in Colombia." Id. at
1079.
43. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 462 (quoting Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97,
104 (1877)).
44. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
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abroad, therefore, the procedure by which "entry" is determined
has become a critical issue.
III. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DEPORTATION HEARINGS AND
EXCLUSION PROCEEDINGS
Essential to an understanding of the differences of opinion be-
tween the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court in Plasencia is a
basic awareness of the distinction between a deportation hearing
and an exclusion proceeding. Although each can result in the de-
portation of an alien from the United States,"' certain conceptual
as well as procedural differences do exist and should be briefly
noted.
Exclusion proceedings determine the admissibility of an alien
who seeks to enter the United States."" Deportation proceedings,
on the other hand, determine the continued residence of an alien
who has entered the United States free from official restraint.7 An
alien who has entered free from official restraint is subject only to
deportation proceedings irrespective of the entry's legality or ille-
gality.48 Thus, the alien who surreptitiously crosses the border and
successfully evades capture at that point is accorded the same
right to deportation proceedings as the alien who was permitted to
enter by the examining immigration officers but thereafter com-
mitted a deportable offense.
There are various procedural distinctions between deportation
and exclusion proceedings.4' For example, in deportation proceed-
ings the government bears the burden of alleging and proving
grounds for discontinuance of the alien's residence and his subse-
45. The Supreme Court defined exclusion, expulsion, and deportation to ensure the
clarity of its opinion in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953). The Court defined
exclusion as "preventing someone from entering the United States who is actually outside
the United States or is treated as being so"; expulsion as "forcing someone out of the United
States who is actually within the United States or is treated as being so"; and deportation as
"the moving of someone away from the United States, after his exclusion or expulsion." Id.
at 596 n.4.
46. See generally IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 16, § 3.18 (right to a fair
hearing).
47. Id. §§ 3.18, 5.1 (nature of deportation proceeding).
48. United States ex rel. Lam Fo Sang v. Esperdy, 210 F. Supp. 786, 790 (S.D.N.Y.
1962) ("The right to a deportation hearing is not curtailed by the illegality of the initial
entry into the United States."); see, e.g., Cheng v. INS, 534 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1976); United
States v. Martin-Plasencia, 532 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1976).
49. Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS, 518 F.2d 278, 280 n.3 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally 1A
C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 16, § 3.18 (right to a fair hearing); id. § 5.5 (basic
concepts of fair treatment).
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quent deportation.5 0 The government must satisfy this burden by
clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.51 In exclusion pro-
ceedings, however, the alien desiring entry must establish his ad-
missibility.52 Furthermore, an alien involved in deportation pro-
ceedings may apply for a suspension of deportation, 3 which if
granted, waives deportability and lawfully admits him for perma-
nent residence.5 ' The alien may also apply for a voluntary depar-
ture,5 5 which, although requiring his departure from the United
States, facilitates his possible return." In contrast, such discretion-
50. Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469 (1963). See generally 1A C. GORDON
& H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 16, § 5.10b (burden of proof).
51. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966); 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(a) (1981).
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
53. Id. § 1254 (1976).
54. The Act sets forth the minimum prerequisites that an alien must establish before
the Attorney General may exercise his discretionary power to grant a suspension of deporta-
tion. The Act creates two categories of prerequisites, the first of which applies to aliens
whose violations are not considered serious. The first category requires that an alien prove
that he has been physically present in the United States for at least seven years preceding
his application for suspension of deportation. He must demonstrate that during the seven-
year period he was a person of good moral character and that he has remained so. He must
demonstrate that his deportation would cause "extreme hardship" to himself or to his
spouse, parent, or child, who is a United States citizen or permanent resident alien. Finally,
he must prove that his violation does not relegate him to the second category. 8 U.S.C. §
1254(a)(1) (1976).
The second category encompasses aliens who have committed serious violations includ-
ing crimes of moral turpitude, narcotic addiction, and subversive behavior. In this category,
the alien must demonstrate that he has been physically present in the United States for at
least ten years immediately following the commission of the act or assumption of the status
constituting the ground for deportation. He must prove that he was a person of good moral
character during the ten-year period and that he is maintaining such a character. Finally, he
must establish that his deportation would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship" to himself or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a United States citizen or
permanent resident alien. Id. § 1254(a)(2).
After approval by the Attorney General, Congress determines whether relief shall be
granted. For first-category cases, the Attorney General's decision is ratified unless either
house of Congress passes a resolution of disapproval. Id. § 1254(c)(2). For second-category
cases, the Attorney General's decision is not ratified unless Congress passes a concurrent
resolution of approval. Id. § 1254(c)(3).
55. Id. § 1254(e). This section provides:
The Attorney General may, in his discretion, permit any alien under deportation
proceedings [except those who have committed serious violations] . . . to depart
voluntarily from the United States at his own expense in lieu of deportation if
such alien shall establish . . . that he is, and has been, a person of good moral
character for at least five years immediately preceding his application for volun-
tary departure . ...
Id.
56. A deported alien requires special permission to return to the United States. If a
deported alien returns without this permission, he is guilty of a felony. Id. § 1326. An alien
who voluntarily leaves the United States before a final deportation order is entered need not
[Vol. 36:969
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ary sanctions are not available to an alien in exclusion proceed-
ings.5 An alien ordered deported may designate the country to
which he will be expelled. An alien ordered excluded, however,
must be returned "to the country whence he came" and no other."
Finally, in deportation proceedings an alien has direct recourse to
a federal court of appeals after the Board of Immigration Appeals
renders an unfavorable judgment.6 The instituting of such an ap-
peal automatically stays the deportation order.61 Review of a final
exclusion order, however, is "by habeas corpus proceedings and not
otherwise.""
Most of the voluntary sanctions and procedural safeguards
available in deportation hearings were designed to protect long-
time resident aliens from the punitive effects of deportation. 3 If
the permanent resident alien remains in the United States, he is
clearly entitled to deportation proceedings.6' If, however, the per-
manent resident alien travels abroad, the reentry doctrine requires
that he again satisfy the requirements of the immigration laws
upon his return to the United States. Accordingly, he may be con-
sidered a new entrant subject to exclusion proceedings. 5
Recognizing the dissimilarity between a returning permanent
resident alien and an alien seeking initial entry, the Supreme
Court in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding"e held that a returning per-
manent resident alien has the constitutional right to procedural
due process and may not be summarily excluded without a fair
hearing that includes notice of the charges against him and an op-
portunity to refute them.e" The Court did not, however, distinguish
between deportation and exclusion proceedings; instead, it noted
that "the issue is not one of exclusion, expulsion or deportation
seek special permission. 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 16, § 7.2a; see also 8
C.F.R. § 243.5 (1981).
57. Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS, 518 F.2d 278, 280 n.3 (9th Cir. 1975).
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1976).
59. Id. § 1227(a).
60. Id. § 1105a(a).
61. Id. § l105a(a)(3).
62. Id. § 1105a(b).
63. The deportation of an alien permanently bars him from the United States unless he
obtains special permission from the Attorney General. See supra note 56. Furthermore, ex-
pulsion ends the alien's continuity of residence necessary for naturalization. 1A C. GORDON
& H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 16, § 4.6d.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
65. Id.
66. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
67. Id. at 596-98.
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. .. [but] one of . . .procedural due process." 8 The Court ex-
pressly recognized, however, the permanent resident alien's unique
status:
"The alien ... has been accorded a generous and ascending
scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society. Mere
lawful presence in the country creates an implied assurance of
safe conduct and gives him certain rights; they become more ex-
tensive and secure when he makes preliminary declaration of in-
tention to become a citizen, and they expand to those of full
citizenship upon naturalization. "ss
Therefore, a permanent resident alien may not be capriciously
denied fifth amendment protections merely because of a voyage to
foreign ports. The Chew Court reversed and remanded the case to
the court of appeals to determine the alien's excludability in a fair
hearing. The lower court interpreted the Supreme Court's decision
to mean that a permanent resident alien is entitled to a hearing at
which the government was the moving party and carried the bur-
den of proof. 0
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit-the same court
that was to hear the Plasencia appeal-indicated its opposition to
subjecting permanent resident aliens to exclusion hearings in Mal-
donado-Sandoval v. INS.7 1 The court held that exclusion proceed-
ings must be terminated when evidence appears that the alien is a
permanent resident merely seeking to return to the United States
after a brief visit abroad." The facts of Maldonado-Sandoval
made the court's finding less definitive than it might have been
under other circumstances. 7 8 The court had initially determined
that Maldonado-Sandoval's attempted return to the United States
did not constitute an entry.7' Consequently, without an entry, ex-
68. Id, at 598.
69. Id. at 597 n.5 (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770-71 (1950)).
70. Kwong Hai Chew v. Rogers, 257 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
71. 518 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court's Plasencia opinion refers to Mal-
donado-Sandoval for an explanation of the specific differences between deportation hear-
ings and exclusion hearings. 103 S. Ct. at 325.
72. 518 F.2d at 281.
73. Maldonado-Sandoval was lawfully admitted for permanent residence in 1967 on the
basis of his marriage to an American citizen. In 1970, INS discovered that Maldonado-San-
doval was already married to a Mexican citizen when he married his American wife. He
visited Mexico in 1970 for a few days and, upon his attempt to return, was refused admis-
sion. INS instituted exclusion proceedings, contending that Maldonado-Sandoval was not in
possession of a valid immigrant visa because his marriage to the American citizen was biga-
mous. Id. at 279-80.
74. Id. at 280-81.
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clusion proceedings would have been improper anyway.m
The cases briefly outlined above demonstrate that appellate
courts have been at least sensitive to significant differences be-
tween exclusion proceedings and deportation hearings, and for the
most part, have accorded permanent resident aliens certain consti-
tutional rights commensurate with their preferred status among
aliens. Following the Fleuti Court's concerns for a more humanita-
rian approach to dealing with permanent resident aliens at the
border, assigning those aliens rights to have the question of "en-
try" determined solely at deportation hearings may have appeared
to be the next logical measure. The United States Supreme Court
in Plasencia, however, was to disagree with the Ninth Circuit and
ensure that such an expansive entitlement would not soon become
a part of immigration law.
IV. Landon v. Plasencia
The Supreme Court's analysis of the rights and privileges due
Mrs: Plasencia as a permanent resident alien began-like the
Ninth Circuit opinion-with a description of the differences be-
tween deportation hearings and exclusion hearings. 7 Addressing
Mrs. Plasencia's contention that she was entitled to the procedural
protections and substantive rights provided by a deportation hear-
ing, the Court turned to the language of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952. Sections 235 and 236 of the Act, the Court
noted, apply to "[a]ll aliens" who seek "admission or readmission
to" the United States and provided for the exclusion hearing as
"the sole and exclusive procedure for determining admissibility of
a person to the United States . . . ." The Court then cited legis-
lative history to demonstrate Congress's intent that admissibility
be determined in an exclusion hearing regardless of the alien's per-
manent residency status.78
75. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 45-62.
77. 103 S. Ct. at 326 (quoting the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, §§ 235,
236(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226(a) (1976)). An earlier district court read the Act to forbid
application of exclusion hearings to cases involving permanent resident aliens. Stacher v.
Rosenberg, 216 F. Supp. 511 (S.D. Cal. 1963). The Stacher court reasoned that the Act's
exclusion provision, which provides for the immediate return of an excludable alien "to the
country whence he came," 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a), could not logically be applied to a permanent
resident alien who had resided in the United States for fifty years.
78. "The special inquiry officer is empowered to determine whether an alien de-
tained for further inquiry shall be excluded and deported or shall be allowed to
enter after he has given the alien a hearing. The procedure established in the bill
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The Court acknowledged the parties' agreement that only "en-
tering" aliens were subject to exclusion, and cited Fleuti as the au-
thoritative interpretation of what constitutes "entry. 7 9 The Fleuti
Court had identified an alien's departure from the United States
"to accomplish some object which is itself contrary to some policy
reflected in our immigration laws " 80 as being meaningfully inter-
ruptive of the alien's permanent residence. Because of the hearing
finding that Mrs. Plasencia had attempted to smuggle aliens, her
departure from the United States was meaningfully interruptive of
her permanent residence, and her return to the United States was
an attempted "entry" within the meaning of the Act.
The point on which the Supreme Court was compelled to disa-
gree with the Ninth Circuit, however, had nothing to do with the
finding per se that Mrs. Plasencia had indeed sought "entry" and
could, therefore, be subjected to an exclusion hearing. Rather, it
was the fact that this determination had been made at an exclu-
sion hearing that the Ninth Circuit characterized as a "manifest
unfairness." 8' The court of appeals had determined that a resident
alien returning from a visit abroad was entitled to a deportation
hearing when it became necessary to litigate issues of "entry" and
excludability. 82
The Supreme Court could not affirm the Ninth Circuit's
sweeping ban on exclusion hearings as the forum for applying the
"meaningfully interruptive" test to permanent resident aliens,"3
nor justify such a holding in light of the perceived congressional
intent behind the Act.84 But both courts shared a fundamental
concern for the due process rights of the permanent resident alien.
In the court of appeals' view-given the distinct procedural differ-
is made the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the admissibility of a
person to the United States."
103 S. Ct. at 326 (quoting S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 29; H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 56, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1711).
79. 103 S. Ct. at 327 (citing Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963)); see supra notes
20-32 and accompanying text. The Fleuti Court developed the "meaningfully interruptive"
test for determining whether an alien's departure from, and reentry into, the United States
should be deemed "intended" under § 101(a)(13) of the Act.
80. 374 U.S. at 462.
81. 637 F.2d at 1289.
82. Id.
83. The Court found using an exclusion hearing to litigate the issue of whether Mrs.
Plasencia was making an "entry" no more unfair or "circular" than allowing "any court to
decide that it has jurisdiction when the facts relevant to the determination of jurisdiction
are also relevant to the merits." 103 S. Ct. at 328.
84. See supra notes 77 & 78 and accompanying text.
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ences between exclusion and deportation hearings-the only forum
guaranteeing the process due a permanent resident alien was the
deportation hearing. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, im-
plied that it was the format and not the forum that might have to
change in order to accommodate Mrs. Plasencia's right to due
process.
The Court was very careful to define the judiciary's role in the
narrow terms of "determining whether the procedures meet the es-
sential standard of fairness under the Due Process Clause." 6 In an
obvious response to the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the Court empha-
sized the need for evaluation of "particular circumstances" in any
given case, and cautioned against "imposing procedures that
merely displace congressional choices of policy.""0 Even after
presenting the appropriate test of the constitutional sufficiency of
a challenged procedure, 87 however, the majority declined to adjudi-
cate Mrs. Plasencia's due process claims on the grounds that the
parties had not had the opportunity to present all factors relevant
to due process analysis.88
In the opinion's final paragraphs, the Court reviewed the three
aspects of the INS hearing in which Mrs. Plasencia claimed her
due process rights were violated. She contended that she was un-
justly encumbered with the burden of proof, that the notice pro-
vided was inadequate, and that she was allowed to waive her right
to representation without a full understanding of the right or of
the consequences of its waiver.89 Although stressing the need to
hear more argument-especially on the government's be-
half-before deciding the due process question, the Court referred
to cases and the policy of the Board of Immigration Appeals as
85. 103 S. Ct. at 330.
86. Id.
87. In evaluating the procedures in any case, the courts must consider the interest
at stake for the individual, risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest
through the procedures used as well as the probable value of additional or differ-
ent procedural safeguards, and the interest of the government in using the cur-
rent procedures rather than additional or different procedures.
Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)). The Court termed Mrs.
Plasencia's interest at stake "a weighty one," referring to the possible loss of her right to
rejoin her immediate family in the United States. 103 S. Ct. at 330.
88. Justice Marshall disagreed and deemed it unnecessary to remand the case for an
inevitable finding that Mrs. Plasencia's due process rights had been violated in the exclusion
hearing. He believed that the facts before the Court were sufficient for such a finding be-
cause Mrs. Plasencia had not been given adequate and timely notice of the charges against
her and of her right to retain counsel to present a defense. 103 S. Ct. at 332 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89. 103 S. Ct. at 330-31.
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well as the Attorney General's regulations in what amounted to the
beginning of its due process analysis. While these comments might
be characterized as dicta, the Court was obviously exemplifying the
kind of analysis expected on remand.
V. CONCLUSION
Both the Supreme Court and the court of appeals derived
their respective conclusions on the Plasencia issues from the same
source-the fundamental guarantee of due process rights afforded
the permanent resident alien, as recognized in Chew. In effect, the
Supreme Court's opinion merely draws the court of appeals back
to that starting point and asks for a careful analysis90 of the spe-
cific due process infirmities alleged under these conditions. The
more extreme solution of flatly prohibiting determination of the
fact of a permanent resident alien's "entry" during an exclusion
hearing is not only unnecessary to preserve the alien's due process
rights, it is also contrary to the language and intent of the Act.
Nonetheless, the Court's opinion further weakens the reentry doc-
trine by subjecting to closer scrutiny the procedural conditions
under which a permanent resident alien's "entry" is to be deter-
mined. Plasencia is consistent with the "humanitarian" approach
of Fleuti and may be viewed as regressive only by those who relied
on the viability of the extreme approach taken by the Ninth
Circuit.
There can be no doubt after Plasencia that the permanent
resident alien returning from abroad" is entitled to more than
merely the hearing guaranteed by Chew, but not necessarily to all
of the rights safeguarded in the routine course of a deportation
hearing. Although the Court emphasized the significance of weigh-
ing all relevant factors of each case, it expressly declined to "de-
cide the contours of the process that is due."'
No one should be very surprised if the Ninth Circuit on re-
mand does find, using the Supreme Court's analysis, that Mrs.
Plasencia's due process rights as a permanent resident alien were
violated in the exclusion hearing. The number of specific violations
90. This analysis involves use of the balancing test created in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976). See supra note 87.
91. The period of absence will, of course, affect the alien's right to due process as a
resident alien. See 103 S. Ct. at 330 (citing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206 (1953) (alien who had left U.S. for twenty months not entitled to due process in
assessing right to readmission)).
92. 103 S. Ct. at 329.
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found will undoubtedly have some effect on the extent of change in
procedural policy INS is likely to eventually implement. The most
efficient solution for INS may be to voluntarily implement the pro-
cedures advocated by the Ninth Circuit and ensure protection of
due process rights by dealing with all permanent resident aliens in
deportation hearings exclusively. A second approach, though far
more difficult to administer, would be to continue dealing with all
aliens entering the country in exclusion hearings at the border, but
to make procedural exceptions for permanent resident aliens where
the specific existing process (e.g., notice) falls below minimal con-
stitutional standards. A third alternative for INS would be to mod-
ify uniformly all exclusion procedures so that they guarantee at
least the minimal due process rights to which permanent resident
aliens are entitled. Administration of immigration policy at the
border, however, would be almost impossible if summary proceed-
ings were banned across the board.
To protect the permanent resident alien's due process rights
most economically and efficiently, INS may perhaps find it wisest
to litigate routinely all issues of such an alien's reentry eligibility
at a deportation hearing-in effect, carrying out voluntarily the
policy that the Ninth Circuit unsuccessfully attempted to
mandate.
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